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Summary
The purpose of this paper is to explore the existence of interactions
between monetary and fiscal policy in their combined impact on economic
activity. Two models using dummy variables to capture different states of
policy are estiniated. Results using a model in which policy effects are
additive differ little from results in which interaction among policies is
allowed. In addition to detecting no significant interaction effects it
is observed that monetary policy has a greater impact on GNP than does
fiscal policy. This result is generated regardless of the model used.

INTERACTION BETUIEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES
by William R. Bryan, A. Janes Keins,
and Morgan J. Lynge, Jr.*
The purpose of this paper is to explore interactions between mone-
tary and fiscal policy in their combined impact on economic activity.
The question is: "do models that allow money and government deficits to
interact in the process of income determination have more explanatory
power than models in which their effects are additive?" In the process
of finding the "no" answer to that question we turn up additional evi-
dence that monetary actions are indeed more important than fiscal actions.
These questions and answers stem from the work of Andersen and
Jordan (1968) and the flow of comment stimulated by that work. Much
of this commentary focused on the inadequacy of reduced-form models
and the choice of monetary and fiscal variables. Here we turn to another
ditsension of the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies—interaction
between these policies.
This note proceeds as follows: First, we lay the groundwork for a
meaningful discussion of "interaction." Second, we discuss the models
to be estimated. Next, the statistical results are presented. Finally,
we summarize our findings.
Interaction
There is a widely-held view that a given rate of increase in
aggregate demand can emerge from many alternative combinations of
monetary and fiscal policies. For illustrative purposes consider
Figure 1. The vertical axis measures rates of change in aggregate
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demand; the horizontal axis measures "expansive" or "restrictive"
fiscal policy; and the third dicension measures the "ease" or "tightness"
of monetary policy.
Figure 1 is drawn as linear in both its variables and its arguments
—
a plane could rest on the points depicted by the "flagpoles". Aggregate
deEand is not affected by an interaction between monetary policy. Mone-
tary policy within the context of a restrictive fiscal policy would have
the same effect on aggregate demand as vjoxild be the case if fiscal policy
were expansive. The work of Andersen-Jordan and of their detractors is
essentially of this character, with no effort to accovmt for interaction
between monetary and fiscal policies.
However, there is reason to believe that the impact of a fiscal
policy change depends upon the monetary-policy environment within which
it occurs. Similarly, the impact of monetary policy depends upon the
fiscal policy environment. Thinking within the conventional IS-LM con-
text, changes in income resulting from a shift in fiscal policy would
depend upon the shape of, and shifts in, the LM schedule; also, the
impact of monetary policy would depend upon the shape of, and shifts in,
the IS schedule. Specifically, there is a presumption that the appro-
priate surface for Figure 1 wovild be generally concave to the origin
—
though it need not be well-behaved.
What is required is a model that permits nonlinearities to be freely
estimated. It would seem that we need a model that would faithfully
replicate whatever surface would be appropriate for Figure 1—assuming
that the plane shown there is inadequate.
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The >fodel
The clue leading to construction of a useful statistical model
emerged from an examination of Figure 1. Instead of attempting to model
the "true" surface, it occurred to us that it would be possible to esti-
mate the heigjit of the supporting "flagpoles." This could be accomplished
by an appropriate arrangement of "dummy" variables.
First, both the monetary and fiscal policy variables could be scaled.
For illustrative purposes, suppose the variables were scaled to conform
to the number of "flagpoles" in Figure 1— that is, in terms of "restric-
tion" or "expansion" in the policy instruments (setting aside questions
of measurement). Such a classification system would create 9 cells, cor-
responding to the potential policy combinations (see Table I).
Table I
ALTERNATIVE POLICY COMBINATIONS
Fiscal Policy:
Expansive (FPE) Neutral (FPN) Restrictive (FPR)
h h. s
\ h h
Monetary Policy ;
Expansive (MPE)
Neutral (MPN)
Restrictive (MPR) 3C_ Xg Xg
The usual approach for using dummy variables in such an application
would be to create three or 1 values for the alternative monetary
policy variables (actually one variable must be dropped) and three or
1 values for the alternative fiscal policy variables. This done, the
following regression model would be estimated:
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(1) y = a^ + a^ MPE + a^ MPR + a^ FPE + a^ FPR + E ;
where, in addition to symbols previously defined, y = aggregate demand.
Suppose the following estimates were obtained: a^, = .02, a^ = .08,
a_ = -.03, a- = .05, and a, = -.04. The estimates of aggregate demand
that could emerge from this model are summarized in Table II.
Table II
POLICY COMBINATIONS AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
Fiscal Policy
Expansive
%
(FPE) Neutral
%
(FPN) Restrictive (FPR)
%
Expansive (MPE) 15 10 6
Neutral (MPN) 7 2 -2
Restrictive (MPR) 4 -1 -5
In this model, the effects of monetary and fiscal policy are addi-
tive. The only thing accomplished by the dummy variable approach is to
permit a non-linearity to emerge in each variable considered separately.
As fiscal policy moves from expansive to netural there is a five per-
centage point decline in aggregate demand; however, the movement from
neutral to restrictive involves a decline of four percentage points.
Similarly, as monetary policy shifts from expansive to neutral aggregate
demand declines by eight percentage points; a further shift to restric-
tive results in only a three percentage point decline in aggregate de-
mand. Note, however, that the effects of changes in, say, monetary
policy do not depend upon the status of fiscal policy. There is no
interaction.
-5-
A different dummy-variable approach would be to estimate each "flag-
pole" separately—with a dunny for each policy ccirbination. The model
to be estimated is (X- through Xg are identified in Table I)
:
(2) y = bQ + b^ X^ + b2 X2 + b^ X^ + b^ X5 + b3 Xg + bg X^ + b^ Xg + bg Xg + E^.
The estimated values of the dependent variable corresponding to
each policy mode would be calcxolated from the estimates of the b's.
If in fact there were no interaction the b coefficients of equation
(2) could be calculated from the a coefficients of equation (1) as
follows
:
^0 = ^0 "^ ^1 "^ % S = -^
b^ = 33 - a^ bg = a2 + 33 - a^ - a^
^2 " '% ^7 " ^2 " ^1 " ^4
b3 = 33 - a^ - a^ ^8 = ^2 ^1
That is, the estimates of the dependent variable obtained from (2) would
not differ from those obtained from (1). However, if there were inter-
action—that is, if the impact of monetary policy depends upon the status
of fiscal policy, and conversely— the estimates of b^ through b_ would
not be derivable from estimates of a- through a, . To that empirical
question we now turn.
Data and Results
The raw data consist of quarterly observations en GNP, the seasonally
2
adjusted money supply (Ml), and the high employment deficit or surplus."
The observations span the period from the first quarter of 1952 through
the fourth quarter of 1978.
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Consistent with the models outlined above, the dependent
variable (OTT) was converted to quarter-cver-quarter percentage changes.
The various states of policy are represented by duinny variables. The
monetary policy dummies were based on the quarter-cver-quarter percent
change in seasonally adjusted ^fl. The 108 quarterly percent changes
were ranked, and the 36 highest growth rates were designated "expansive,"
the next 36 growth rates were designated "neutral," and lowest 36 growth
rates were "restrictive." The boundaries of these three categories and
the monetary policy dunmy values are shown in the top panel of Table III.
The fiscal policy dumnies were based on the change in the high employment
deficit or surplus for each quarter. The 36 largest negative changes
are "expansive" and so on. The lower panel of Table III gives the
bcxmdaries and values for the fiscal policy dummies.
Table III
DEFINITION OF POLICY DUMMY VALUES
Range of values
for % A in Ml MPE MPN MPR
Value of Median
Observation
1.295 to 2.484 1 1.76
0.717 to 1.287 1 0.99
-0.623 to 0.705 1 0.28
Range of values
for A HED
($ billions) FPE FPN FPR
-48.1 to -1.2 1 -3.2
-1.0 to +1.3 1 -0.3
1.4 to 26.8 1 -2.7
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The dummy variables attempt to account for the inpact of monetary
and fiscal policies on G?P growth. To improve the specification of the
proposed models, the impact of changes in private demand that are not
induced by economic policies should be included in an explanation of GNP
growth. This private demand effect is captured in the variable PD. In
order to isolate the effects of private demand on GNP growth that are
independent of current monetary and fiscal policies, the following tech-
nique was used. Gross domestic investment (GDI) was chosen as a measure
of private demand. The quarterly percent change in GDI was regressed on
the quarterly percent change in ICL and the change in the high employment
3deficit. The residuals from this regression contain that portion of GDI
that is not explained by monetary and fiscal policies. This residual
was then used as the variable PD.
Before discussing the test results, it is of interest to inspect
the distribution of combinations of monetary and fiscal policies. Table
IV shows the number of observations occurring for each policy combina-
tion. The numbers in in parentheses in Table IV represent the theoreti-
cal distribution of observations that would emerge if there were in-
dependence between monetary and fiscal policy. The actixal and theoretl-
4
cal distributions are not significantly different.
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Table IV
DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY CO>iBINATIOMS
Monetary Fiscal Policy
Policy Expansive (FPE)
.
Neutral (EPN) Restrictive (FPR)
Expansive (MPE) 11
(12)*
9
(12)
16
(12)
Neutral (MPN) 13
(12)
11
(12)
12
(12)
Restrictive (MPR) 12
(12)
16
(12)
8
(12)
*The numbers in parentheses represent the theoretical distribution.
This result is surprising to those who would expect to find a
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. If economic conditions
required stimulus they would expect both monetary and fiscal policy to
be expansive—and conversely during periods when restriction is appro-
priate. Table IV suggests precisely the opposite behavior. Subtracting
actual from theoretical observations generates a set of positive values
(not significantly different from zero) along the northwest-southeast
diagonal and a large negative value in the northeast comer. That is,
monetary policy has tended to offset fiscal policy.
If we were apologists for policy makers we could—with straight
faces
—
justify this result. We would argue that fiscal policy is set
correctly from time to time, while monetary policy is used to "fine-time"
the economy. During such periods the Fed would "lean" against fiscal
policy to moderate its impact. At other times, fiscal policy might be
unresponsive to the needs of the economy, forcing the monetary authority
to carry the entire burden of appropriate counter cyclical policy.
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The Additive Model
We turn now to efforts to estimate the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy. First we estimate the additive model, equation (1),
with the following results:
Bq a^
fi ^ ^ ^
%A GNP = 1.546 + 0.730 MPE - 0.651 MPR + 0.413 FPE + 0.202 FPR + 0.136 PD
(10.49) (4.49) (-4.11) (2.69) (1.28) (11.12)
R"^ = .65 DW = 1.99 SE = 0.645
_2
The values in parentheses are t-statistics; R , DW, and SE are
2
adjusted R
,
Durbin-Watson statistic and standard error of the
estimate respectively. These estimates result from the application
of the Cochran-Orcutt transformation to reduce the first order auto-
correlation in the residuals.
The estimated coefficients produce the combinations of policy
impacts shown in Table V. For example, expansive monetary policy
coupled with expansive fiscal policy produce a 10.76 percent annual
rate of growth in GNP. A gross movement from expansive to restric-
tive fiscal policy would result in a 0.85 percentage point decline in
growth of GNP, calculated by subtracting any element in the left column
from its counterpart in the right column. Recall that the additive model
makes fiscal policy independent of the mode of monetary policy. But the
impact of shifts in fiscal policy is inconsistent in its application.
While the movement from expansive to neutral fiscal policy results in
a 1.66 percentage point decline in WP growth, the movement from neutral
to restrictive fiscal policy results in a slight rise in GNP growth.
This is an unexpected result, and is based on the coefficient of MPR (a.)
that is not significantly different from zero.
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Table V
POLICY CCIIBINATICNS AIJD AGGREGATE DE^^ID
ADDITIVE MODEL (Equation 1)
I'onetary Fiscal Pol.icy
Policy Expansive (FPE) Neutral
%
(FPN) Restrictive (FPR)
%
Expansive (MPE) 10.76* 9.10* 9.91
Neutral (MPN) 7.84* 6.18* 6.99
Restrictive (MPR) 5.23* 3.58* 4.39
*A11 xmderlying coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level.
In striking contrast, the impact of monetary policy is greater
than that of fiscal policy, and is consistent in its mode-to-mode
application. The movement from restrictive to expansive monetary
policy results in a 5.53 percentage point increase in the growth of
QTP. Moreover, as indicated, the mode-to-mode changes are consistent.
A change in monetary policy from restrictive to neutral is accompanied
by a 2.60 percentage point increase in GNP growth; movement from
neutral to expansive is accompanied by an increase of 2.92 percentage
points. These increases do not depend on the fiscal policy mode.
The Interaction Model
We turn now to a discussion of results with the interaction model.
Estimates of equation (2) are:
^ ^ ^ ^ N_ ^
%A GNP = 2.604 + 0.022 XI - 0.425 X2 - 0.773 X4 - 0.869 X5 - 0.886 X6
(15.10) (0.09) (-1.55) (-3.16) (-3.35) (-3.55)
\ h. \ \
- 1.086 X7 - 1.796 X8 - 1.708 X9 + 0.139 PD
(-4.26) (-7.38) (-5.82) (10.99)
—2
R = .66 DW = 1.93 SE = 0.643
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The adjusted R" of equation (2) is not significantly different
fron that of equation (1), In equation (1) 5 of the 6 estiniated
coefficients were significar.t ; in equation (2) 8 of the IC coefficients
are significant. In terns of the Durbin-Watson statistic and the
standard error of the estiioate it appears that neither estimated
equation is superior to the other.
The coefficient estimates of equation (2) produce the combinations
p
of policy impacts shown in Table VI. As in the case of the additive
model, the pattern of estimates associated with monetary policy variables
is consistent with expectations. That is, regardless of the fiscal
policy mode, a movement toward monetary restriction is associated with
a reduced pace of QIP expansion. And as before, the pattern of coefficients
associated with fical policy changes is not consistent \rith expectations.
Table VI
POLICY COMBUSTIONS AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
INTERACTION MODEL (Equation 2)
Monetary Fiscal Policy
Policy Expansive (FPE) Neutral (FPN) Restrictive (FPR)'
Expansive (MPE) 10.51 8.72 10.42*
Neutral (MPN) 7.33* 6.94* 6.87*
Restrictive (MPR) 6.07* 3.23* 3.59*
*Coefficient is significant at 0.05 level.
In all cases movement from expansive to netural fiscal policy resulted
in a reduction of QvP growth, but in two of these cases movement from
neutral to restrictive fiscal policy was accompanied by QIP expansion.
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Moreover, all GNP changes associated with any shift in ncnetary policy
vere nuch greater than any G2'P changes associated ^^riLth a shift in
fiscal policy.
We new turn to the central question posed in this paper. Does
allowance for the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy offer
explanatory power not provided in a model based on simple addition
of effects? A casual look at the statistics for our regressions
and the values shown for the combined effects of monetary and fiscal
policies in Tables V and VI suggests a hearty "no" to that question.
In only one case was the direction of GNP change associated with mode
to mode change in policy different in the two modes. A move from
money neutral and fiscal neutral mode to m.oney neutral and fiscal
restrictive mode in table VI registers a reduction in QTP growth as
expected (but not significant) . The same modal move in Table V is
accompanied by an increase in QJP growth, contrary to expectations.
In all other cases , whether along rows or colimms , or along any
diagonal, the two models generate the same directional impact of
combined monetary and fiscal policies on GNP.
Having argued that there is no essential difference in the two
models, we feel it appropriate to point out those results where
differences do appear. If we rely on the interactive model—Table VI—
monetary changes appear to have greater impact when fiscal policy is
neutral or restrictive than when fiscal policy is expansive. That is,
movements along columns two and three generate exaggerated changes in
GNP growth compared to movements along column one. Recall that in
the additive model, changes in GNP accompanying policy changes are
the same in all columns (or rows)
.
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Having responded to the central question, we now turn to an
assessirent of the relative inpact of ucr.etary and fiscal policies.
Indeed, the findings presented in both Tables V and VI fairly scream
for recognition on this point, ^fcnetary policy has the expected
impact on S^P growth irrespective of the mode of fiscal policy. That
impact is consistent and marked in every case.
To the contrary, the effect of fiscal policy is mixed, in the
expected direction at times, perverse at other times. Beyond the
lack of consistency, the effect of changes in fiscal policy are clearly
less marked than changes in monetary policy. We take this to be but
one more link in the chain of evidence mounting to support the claim
that only money matters. Our only finding that offers significant
evidence to the contrary comes from the third row of Table VI. Here
it is seen that movement from a restrictive to expansive fiscal policy
in the interactive model provides a significant boost to WP growth
when nonetary policy is in the restrictive mode.
We offer one final scenario that talks to the "crowding out"
hypothesis. Suppose we start in the southeast comer of Table VI;
monetary and fiscal policies are tight within the context of an
interactive model. If we moved to expansive monetary policy,
holding to the restrictive fiscal stance, GNP growth would increase
6.83 percent (10.42 - 3.59). If we assume no increase in the rate of
government spending or taxes—consistent with the continuing stance
of restrictive fiscal policy—the increase in GNP growth would be
generated by the private sector.
-14-
Consider now a simultaneous change in fiscal and monetary policies
tc expansion on both fronts, a movenLenr to the northwest comer of
Table VI. The resultant increase in CiTP grovjth would be 6.92, hardly
different from the 6.83 percent realized with no fiscal expansion.
If we assumed the fiscal expansion to have come frcm increases in
government spending, then some part of the increase in QIP growth
came from government activity. Since the overall increase was the
same as that generated by a change in m.oney alone, the effect of
fiscal expansion must have been to "crowd out" private activity.
Summary of Findings
The novelty of our approach Is the simplicity of its statistical
design. There is complete freedom in coefficient estimation. Hence,
any pattern of effects, or interaction, could have emerged. That a
similar pattern restilted from both the additive and interaction models,
lends credibility to these results.
With respect to the question that motivated this work, the results
indicate that a model that allows for interactions between monetary and
fiscal policy fails to explain spending better than a simpler additive
model. Statistics of significance are essentially the same in both
models; and predicted results of an interacting monetary and fiscal
policy differ little from predictions emanating from a simple addition
of effects.
Another aspect of these results merits special mention. Changes in
money appear to matter a good bit more than changes in the government's
fiscal position. Monetary expansion in our model was uniformly accom-
panied by income expansion. These results were generated by the additive
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as well as the interactive model; and the effect of money was independent
of the stance of fiscal policy.
In striking contrast, the effects of fiscal policy—ineasured by
changes in the full employment surplus or deficit—were mixed. Some-
times the increase in the deficit was coincident with income expansion;
at other times the reverse was true. We take this to be but another
link in the chain of findings that supports the position that money de-
termines income—leaving fiscal actions to affect the deviation between
private and government investment.
M/E/122
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FOCTNOTES
^Professors of Finance, Economics, and Assistant Professor of
Finance, respectively. University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign.
For earlier work see Smyth (1963), Hansen (1973), and Meyer
and Hart (1975).
2
There was extensive experimentation with alternative measures
of monetary and fiscal policies. Results with the monetary base were
not materially different from those Xv-ith the money supply. However,
alternative fiscal policy measures produced markedly different results.
We have reported the results that do least violence to accepted theory.
3
This regression gave the follo\d.ng:
"A GDI = -0.868 + 2.803 %A ^a + 0.170 AHED R^ = .152
(-0.96) (3.82) (2.41) DW = 1.88
where the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
4
Eased on a chi-square test.
However, the evidence imdermines this explanation. Over the
108 quarters monetary policy switched into a new category (e.g., from
restrictive to neutral) 42 times. Fiscal policy had 65 such switches,
indicating that the thrust of fiscal policy changed more frequently
than monetary policy.
For the values in Table V, PD (private demand) is set to its
mean value of (approximately) zero.
This result is obtained from (a-, + a, + a-) x 4. The multi-
plication by 4 converts the quarter-to-quarter changes to an annual
rate.
g
Again, PD was set to its mean value of (approximately) zero.
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9
A t-test for significant differences among the estinates
along the rows of Table 'H! found that the only estimates that are
significantly different (at the 0.05 level) are the 6.G7 and the
3.23 in the restrictive monetary policy row. To the contrary, tests
for significant differences rccring down the columns of Table ^71
found only two instances of estimates that are not significantly
different. These two instances are 7.33 and 6.07 in the expansive
fiscal policy column and 8.72 and 6.94 in the neutral fiscal policy
column.
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Notes
We required the firms to be listed during the entire sample
period. The Center for Security Price Research (CFSP) monthly tape
was used to select NYSE listed firms. A firm was considered listed
if it had monthly stock retuims available for the entire sample period.
2
The absolute percentage error is computed as the average of
Actual EPS - Predicted EPS
Since this error metric can be explosive
Actual EPS
when the denominator approaches zero we truncated errors in excess of
ten to a value of ten. This operation was done for a very small percent-
age of the cases.




